Field, Sussex in 1667, was vicar of Slaugham from 1679 to 1692, became rector of Plympton and prebendary of Chichester in 1690, and vicar of Cutchold in 1692. He was a friend of More, Rust (whose Remains he edited), Cudworth and Worthington.

In Hallywell's A Discourse of the Excellency of Christianity (1677) innate ideas are defined as 'nothing but reason, or that Power in man which teaches him to distinguish and put a difference between Good and Evil' (p. 5). The soul of man has a perceptive and a plastic part: God has copied out the whole of nature into rational agents, so far as they were capable of receiving it, and Revelation confirms this. All Hallywell's works show a general conformity with Cambridge Platonism. Indeed, Deus justificatus (1668), which was published anonymously, was commonly assumed to be by Cudworth. Hallywell also wrote separate tracts on the use of reason and on morals, famism and revealed religion.

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Hallywell viewed faith itself as the assent of the intellect: 'the spirit of God works but by men, and is no wayes secret in its operations to themselves, and no way evident to others, but by its effects in Reason or Discourse, which nothing differs from Reason itself' (p. 6). Yet for Hammond reason was more than a merely formal faculty. He in fact adhered to a conservative version of natural-law theory, and reiterated Hooker's claim that such law has an ontological status independent of covenant and convention. Thus even divine laws presuppose 'Pre-existent faculties, and Notions of Reason in conceiving' (p. 4). Salvation consequently comes to depend more upon inquiry than upon belief.

Inspired by Hugo Grotius's attempt in De veritate religionis Christianae (1627) to construct a rational demonstration of Christianity, Hammond composed his own treatise Of the Reasonableness of Christian Religion (1650). Rationality can be understood either theoretically as sufficient evidence for demonstrable truth or, in a more pragmatic sense, as the means to the attainment of given ends. Hammond sees upon the latter sense in his defence of Christianity as the reasonable and prudent course in the realm of moral action. Religion is justified precisely on account of its inspiration to good action; the rationality of Christian belief stands upon its moral necessity. Following Grotius and Arminius, Hammond rejected the Calvinistic account of predestination. Indeed, Hammond held 'that God justifies none who are unsanctified' (Reasonableness, Works, 1847–50, vol. 1, p. 149) and thus seemed to depart from the classical reformed teaching formulated in the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion that 'faith alone' justifies. His moralistic soteriology, expounded at length in the highly influential treatise A Practical Catechism (1644), was criticized by Francis Cheyne, pelagian. In the spirit of Erasmian Protestant humanism, Hammond defended Grotius repeatedly against accusations of Socinianism and popery.

Hammond assumed the ideal of the corpus Christianum whereby 'there is not any man of the church of England, but the same is also a member of the Commonwealth' (Hooker, Folger Library Edition, vol. 3, p. 319) and viewed the universal faculty of reason as the main support for a broadly conceived national Church. The infallibility of ecclesiastical tradition and Scripture are both rejected in favour of reason as the 'rule of faith'. In principle, the universality of innate 'common notions' offered the basis for free and unconstrained consent to ecclesiastical uniformity. For Hammond the fallibility of reason nonetheless precludes the possibility of any final resolution of religious controversy. Despite (or perhaps because of) this potential foothold for scepticism, Hammond postulated a set of fundamental beliefs with respect to Christian conduct (as distinct from dogma) in a treatise Of Fundamentals (Works, 1847–50, vol. 1, pp. 461–99). Parting ranks with others in the Great Tew Circle, however, Hammond defended the pure divino origin of episcopacy. He was called as a member of the Convocation held in conjunction with the Short Parliament in 1640 and was among the very few sympathetic to Episcopal jurisdiction to attend the Westminster Assembly in 1643. As a staunch Royalist, he wrote tracts critical of
rebellion and the Parliamentary cause. His A Paraphrase and Annotations upon all the Books of the New Testament (1653) is a pioneering work of modern biblical criticism.

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HARRINGTON
James (1611—77)

James Harrington was the son of a well-established Lincolnshire family, related by marriage to a number of the higher aristocracy. His father, Sir Sapcotes Harrington, died while he was still a young man and left him a large fortune. After studying at Trinity College, Oxford (he left without taking a degree), he made the customary tour of Europe, visiting Holland, Denmark, Germany, France and Italy. As he tells us, his travels greatly increased his political knowledge and broadened his outlook. He was particularly impressed by the Republic of Venice and its constitution, and he returned to England in 1635 convinced of the virtues of republican government. These sentiments notwithstanding, he was on intimate and affectionate terms with Charles I, to whom he remained loyal to the end. After the king’s arrest in 1647, Harrington was among those who were allowed to keep him company during his imprisonment. The story (due to Harrington’s early biographers Toland and Aubrey) that he accompanied the king to the scaffold is, however, probably false. Harrington played no great part in public life: he unsuccessfully contested a Parliamentary seat in 1642, but never again sought to enter Parliament. After the king’s execution, his financial independence enabled him to devote most of his time to the production of his major literary achievement, The Commonwealth of Oceana. After initial difficulties – the manuscript was confiscated at the printer’s and only returned at the personal intervention of Cromwell, to whom it is addressed – Oceana was published in London in 1656, and much of Harrington’s life thereafter was devoted to elaborating and defending its proposals. In 1659 he founded the Rota Club, the membership of which included some very advanced democrats. After the Restoration, he came under suspicion of conspiring to bring back the Commonwealth. He was arrested in December 1661 and imprisoned in the Tower. During his imprisonment his mental and physical health deteriorated rapidly, largely thanks to ill-judged medical advice. Eventually released, he never recovered fully; but there is probably no truth in the story that he died insane.

As Harrington understands it, the work of the political theorist is primarily historical and comparative. The constitutional arrangements set forth in Oceana are virtually all developed by reference to the governments of the Jews, Rome, Sparta and Venice, and to the study of existing governments: Harrington is unwilling to recommend anything that has not already been tried and proved successful. He is also almost entirely classical in his literary outlook: He has little time for the political thinkers of his own age. He speaks highly of Hobbes, but only as a philosopher; he greatly dislikes his politics. He finds his political models in Plato’s Laws, Aristotle’s Politics, the Historiae of Polybius and the writings of Machiavelli, whom he especially admires. In form Oceana is an elaborate and rather laborious fiction, describing the formation of a new government for the imaginary commonwealth of Oceana. It is a utopia: a description, not of an actual state, but of the state as it should be. No doubt Harrington chose to write as he did in order to evade the censorship, but it is perfectly clear that Oceana is supposed to be England, and that the events, places, and personages depicted in the book are only thinly disguised. ‘Emporium’ is London, ‘Hiera’ is Westminister, ‘Leviathan’ is Thomas Hobbes, ‘Panurgus’ is Henry VII, ‘Parthenia’ is Elizabeth I; ‘Olpheus Megaletor’ is Cromwell, and so on. The fiction of Oceana is not continued in his later writings.

Harrington is alone among his contemporaries in proposing a straightforward causal relation between economic distribution and political power. It is to this fact that subsequent commentators have without exception pointed in evaluating his contribution to political theory. The form and operation of government will, he insists, always depend upon the distribution of property, and especially of landed property. Whoever holds the ‘balance of property’, as he calls it, will rule. Harrington adopts a threefold classification of constitutions: a classification obviously inspired by Book 3 of Aristotle’s Politics, but modified in the light of his beliefs about property distribution. When control of the land is vested in a monarch who lets it out to a large number of small tenants in return for military service, the result is absolute monarchy, as exemplified in imperal Rome and the Turkish empire. When control of the land is in the hands of a relatively small number of nobles who are able to maintain